A purely syntactic, structuralist perspective would suggest exactly this conclusion, whether it's drawn from algorithmic complexity or some other measure of 'form.' If adopted, it poses a 'hard problem' which is: why is there anything real at all in a world of form, just as consciousness theorists ask 'why is there any consciousness at a…
A purely syntactic, structuralist perspective would suggest exactly this conclusion, whether it's drawn from algorithmic complexity or some other measure of 'form.' If adopted, it poses a 'hard problem' which is: why is there anything real at all in a world of form, just as consciousness theorists ask 'why is there any consciousness at all' in a world of matter. Of course in both cases, it's possible to deny the hard problem, i.e., to say there's nothing else but form or nothing else but matter and the respective hard problem is a non-problem.
A purely syntactic, structuralist perspective would suggest exactly this conclusion, whether it's drawn from algorithmic complexity or some other measure of 'form.' If adopted, it poses a 'hard problem' which is: why is there anything real at all in a world of form, just as consciousness theorists ask 'why is there any consciousness at all' in a world of matter. Of course in both cases, it's possible to deny the hard problem, i.e., to say there's nothing else but form or nothing else but matter and the respective hard problem is a non-problem.